A perplexing and sometimes distressing indeterminacy shadows the scene of death in the early twenty-first century-a scene that had once been characterised by a reasonably firm sense of finality. Take, for example, the concept of 'brain death' that has enabled the extension of life through organ donation. Consider also the extraction of 'live' sperm from the recently deceased in order to create posthumous embryos. These are both constructed biotechnological effects that give rise to new inconclusive death scenes that in turn provoke novel legal and cultural responses.
Another such death scene, and the one with which we are principally concerned in this essay occurs in the IVF clinic.
In the IVF clinic, a place designed principally for the production of life, clinicians and IVF recipients are faced with a dilemma-how should they dispose of those embryos that, for a variety of reasons, are deemed surplus? As we write there are thousands of cryopreserved embryos awaiting such disposition decisions. 1 The options for disposition are many. Embryos may be thawed for transfer, they may be donated for research or for use by other infertile people, they may remain frozen, or VOLUME17 NUMBER1 MAR2011 82 they may variously be allowed to-and here the choice of words is telling-'succumb', 2 be disposed of, 3 or allowed to die. 4 Here, we consider those disposition methods that involve some form of ethical management and memorialisation. We argue that what is being managed and memorialised constitutes a death scene of sorts-one where death itself is curiously absent. It is a death scene where the potentiality of that which has not lived is acknowledged yet purposely denied the luxury of a fully realised narrative. Ontic recognition is tied to a ceremonial foreshortening. We offer an account of the medical, cultural and legal management of this 'death scene' and ask how 'deaths' are produced through interaction with surplus embryos: not as a life lost, but as something else.
-EMBRYO DISPOSITION Methods of embryo disposition vary according to the legal and clinical regimes in place. In Australia, for example, the National Health and Medical Research Council's
Ethical Guidelines on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice
and Research (NHMRC ART Guidelines) and various pieces of state legislation place a time limit on the storage of cryopreserved embryos. 5 While in other jurisdictions, such as some states in the United States, it may be possible to continue cryopreservation indefinitely (assuming the costs can be met), in Australia it seems clear that all patients with cryopreserved embryos must make a disposition decision at some point. In the absence of a directive, clinics are required to dispose of cryopreserved embryos after the requisite time period has expired. As noted at the outset, disposition options include donation of the embryo for research and donation to another person or couple for their reproductive use. Where a person decides instead to dispose of their embryos permanently through discard there are a number of different methods that are available. We are most interested in a method of disposition that relies on the female body to provide an end point for the embryo.
In such cases the clinic transfers the surplus embryo either into the woman's vagina where it cannot develop further, or into her uterus at a time when implantation is unlikely and without the benefit of fertility-enhancing hormones. Alternatively, in jurisdictions where the law permits, some women might elect to extend David Ellison and Isabel Karpin-Embryo Disposition 83 cryopreservation until the onset of menopause-at which point the embryo is transferred on the understanding that implantation will not occur. 6 These methods of disposal are sometimes referred to as ' 9 This prohibition, together with the requirement set out in Article 119(2)c of the Swiss Constitution that 'no more human egg cells may be developed into embryos outside the woman's body than are capable of being immediately implanted into her', means that Swiss clinics are required to transfer all embryos into the woman's body at the time they are created, if possible. 10 When the legislation came into effect most IVF clinics were cultivating at least three fertilised eggs into embryos to ensure that at least one was suitable for transfer. As the technology was not sufficiently advanced to determine with accuracy which fertilised eggs would successfully develop into cleaved embryos (embryos whose cells had begun to divide), three were developed with the intention of selecting the best two for transfer. In order to abide by the letter of the law and avert the risk of triplets, the third and remaining embryo was 'implanted into' (in compliance with the wording of Article 119(2)c of the Swiss Constitution) the woman's vagina where it could not develop further. 11 This is how the practise was described by 'H.', one of a number of women interviewed in a study conducted by Scully et al.: 'The rest of the embryos, they said they would simply put them back in the vagina, so they come to an ethical end, somewhere.' 12 Note that not only does 'H.' draw on a discourse of 'ethical ends' but she also refers to the embryo as
returning-it is 'put back'-even though the embryo (in that form) has never actually been inside her body in the first place. In somewhat more clinical terms the practice has been described by the director of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at the University Hospital Zurich, Professor Bruno Imthurn, as follows:
From the legal and biological point of view it is the same to discard embryos or to replace them into the vagina. In both situations they are destroyed. However, for many patients (and also for me) it is a difference from their (and my) ethical point of view, whether to put the embryos in a garbage bin or returning them to the body of the corresponding patient. 13 While 'H.' clearly draws on the vocabulary of the clinic as modelled by Imthurn, her account differs to the degree that it is marked by uncertainty. Her version appears more tentative, conjuring an ethical end, 'somewhere'. Arguably, 'H.''s tentative response suggests that the ethics produced out of this bodily procedure are far from self-evident. Studies by Lyerly, de Lacey, Haimes and Scully, among others, have shown that the value accorded to embryos by the clinicians and gamete providers who jointly create them is replete with uncertainty and indeed ambivalence. 14 The transformation then, of this essentially strategic, if not evasive, clinical practice into an 'ethical' and 'compassionate' one raises complex questions that require further interrogation.
-'COMPASSIONATE TRANSFER' AS ETHICAL PRACTICE
We consider two quite different responses to the practice of compassionate transfer that we outline below. First, the idea of the ex utero in vitro cryopreserved embryo's 'return' to the female body reminds us that its disconnection from that body is a technological artefact. As Karpin notes elsewhere:
The embryo is only connected with its potential for personhood by female embodiment. Those who wish to make the argument that all embryos have equivalent value do so only by rendering the female body irrelevant. 15 In this way, the return of surplus embryos to the female body for their disposal Louise: they certainly don't always take anyway. They, you know, just die when you thaw them out quite often. 16 De Lacey then notes that[rather than being concerned about waste, 'the "Discard" group perceived waste in reproduction (especially IVF) to be normal'. 17 In this instance the embodied nature of loss is transposed across the clinical practice of disposition. We can see, therefore, how the step of placing or, notionally at least, 'returning' the embryo to the woman's body might be construed as 'compassionate'.
It is a means of recasting as 'natural', and so to some extent beyond control, an artificially created and regulated cycle of production and loss. What is not clear in the practice of compassionate transfer is who in this arrangement extends compassion to whom? We will return to this below.
A second possible reading of this practice of compassionate transfer is to view the 'return' of surplus embryos to the female body as treating the receptive body as crypt. Given the understanding that this procedure cannot produce a child, placing the thawed embryo in the female body effectively re-sets the clock to a moment prior to the clinic's technological intervention, where failed reproduction and loss were the likely or inevitable outcome of attempted pregnancy. However, in this instance what was a pathologised inability to create and sustain life is redeemed as the mechanism and means of an ethical terminus.
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In order to pin down which of these two possible responses (while acknowledging the possibility of others) we find more compelling, we need to turn to the participants and how they view this practice.
While the various participants required for compassionate transfer to occur appear clear enough-the woman, joined perhaps by her partner or family member, and a clinical staff member-it is harder to identify the addressee of the ritual. Is it for the patients who are faced with these disposition decisions? Is it for the clinician, who may or may not have issues of conscience regarding the routine disposal of embryos as medical waste? Or is it on the behalf of the embryo itself?
We think that compassionate transfer might offer a way of valuing the loss of an embryo-paradoxically through the disposition decision itself-because it solemnises loss in the context of a purposeful giving up. There is value found or at least considered in these embryos-but not, we argue, as life lost, but as something different. That value is quite distinct from that used to sustain a right to life argument where one mourns the disposed embryo as an extinguished life. In contrast, the starting premise of 'ethical' disposal countenances the capacity to value embryos without according them life. Insofar as anti-abortion activists have weighed into the question of surplus embryos, they have characterised them as imperilled and in need of rescue or adoption. The failure to do so is described as equivalent to the avoidable death of a person. 18 In this 'right-to-life' frame there can be no ethical end, as Imthurn describes it. Rather, all such ends are tragic and produce a measure of culpability. Within the clinic, in the context of 'compassionate transfer', this is not the case. Instead those ends are a deliberate technological and discursive moment created to mark the loss of something that there is no need (or desire) to keep or rather continue to store. What is mourned, celebrated, ceremonialised, ethicised is the loss (to the mother/father/clinic) of something that has been voluntarily forfeited.
Neither fully living nor dead, subject nor object, the surplus embryo destined One by one that day, the family viewed the embryos through the microscope … After the viewing, the Archibalds poured the contents of the Petri Dishes into a potted Azalea that they'd brought with them. They took the bush home, waited for spring, and planted it in the backyard. 19 Note here how the attempt to create a mourning object shares a common grammar of display with the implantation procedure-much as funerals and weddings borrow from each other's grammar of spectacle. The viewing of the embryo through the microscope, followed by the empty Petri dish, resemble the clinical practice followed during an embryo transfer performed in the expectation of implantation and pregnancy. There the woman, separated from the sterile room where the embryo is thawed in preparation, is typically given the option to view the embryo prior to transfer. Generally this involves viewing a screen displaying the thawed embryo in a Petri dish, then, post-transfer, a confirmatory close up of the now empty dish. 20 There is much more to say about this but here we are most interested in the composition of the ethical act. Notably, in the Archibald's case, unlike those where so-called compassionate transfer occurs, there is no intermediating act of female embodiment. That this could be a death scene at all is complicated by the fact it seems to borrow from few if any of our accepted conventions governing the end of life. These come readily to mind, either in their ideal form-we might think here of palliative care-or in the dreaded and frantic melee of the ICU: of intubation, or other invasive resuscitation efforts in the absence of a meaningful prospect of recovery. To this, one might add other representations of death that are, of necessity, missing from the disposition ceremony: the closing of eyes, the cessation of breath, the coming of pallor, the dwindling of heat. All of these signs play an important role in our understanding of death and yet none of them governs the VOLUME17 NUMBER1 MAR2011 88 scene we've chosen that ends not with a corpse, but with a pipette, Petri dish or vial. This is a 'death' without a body or, rather, it is a stage, almost more temporal than physical en route to embodiment; it is invisible yet visualisable, it can be made to pass from a state of apparent life to a state of apparent death by exposing it to nothing more taxing than room temperature. It is an imperfect state between liquid and solid. Paradoxically, the end of the embryo is composed out of the same elements and employing the same materials that signal the inaugural potential for life as it is framed in the IVF clinic.
-THE SCIENCE OF EMBRYO LAW
In order to understand how this end scene emerged as a necessity it is worth considering the pressure produced by the highly regulated and burgeoning number of cryopreserved embryos.
Currently in Australia (as in the US and the UK) there are many thousands of embryos in cold storage. 21 These are the product of IVF programs where multiple embryos are created to give the woman the greatest chance of achieving a live birth.
In 2007 for example, there were 56,817 ART treatment cycles reported in Australia and New Zealand and of these treatment cycles, 22.6 per cent (12,815) led to a 'clinical pregnancy' and 17.4 per cent resulted in a live delivery. 22 Typically, during IVF the woman is given hormone therapy to increase the number of eggs produced in a single cycle. These eggs are harvested and fertilised to create embryos. Some embryos, assessed as non-viable, will not make it past this stage in the process.
Although beyond the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that embryo disposition decisions proliferate throughout the IVF process. Consider, for example, what is at stake when an embryologist makes a visual assessment of an embryo to determine its quality for transfer or cryopreservation and decides against both. 23 Such a routine disposition decision is typically characterised as uncontroversial and does not necessitate respectful framing of these actions in terms of loss. This process of so called 'embryo grading' is a developing technology with limited evidence of its efficacy. 24 A similar outcome occurs for those embryos that undergo single cell biopsy-otherwise known as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD)-that are found to contain a defect. 25 They too are disposed of without ceremony.
These embryos might be construed by those attuned to disability rights as subject to radically normativising discourses that favour the consignment of the nonnormative to oblivion. 26 Importantly, however, and contrary to anti-abortion rhetoric, it is not the value inherent in embryonic life that the disability theorist might mourn but the value of the possibility of non-normative life itself.
In the literature we have examined so far there is no ceremony that has been developed to attend to the disposition of these non-normative 'embryos'. For instance, Robert Shabanowitz, an embryologist from Geisinger Medical Centre in Pennsylvania, describes his 'angst' in response to discarding cyropreserved embryos while merely noting in passing the inevitable disposal of those that are, in his view, nonviable:
Disposing of human embryos is one of the more difficult responsibilities assigned to an embryologist in a fertility clinic. Disposal is not performed without a certain amount of angst; embryologists, after all, are primarily charged with the culture and transfer of embryos, not their destruction.
Although we routinely discard embryos that are considered nonviable or fail to develop in culture, disposing of cryopreserved embryos represents those embryos that are considered to have the greatest potential for implantation... 27 [emphasis added] Thus, those embryos that receive a low grade or are found to carry a genetic flaw are routinely and unceremoniously discarded. In other words, they are pre-emptively dead in the way that viable embryos are accorded a presumptive claim to life that is confirmed or ratified in their cryopreservation. 28 In this economy of embryonic value clinics and patients are given room to attend to the loss of those embryos that were rated highly enough to warrant cryopreservation, but are assumed to have no investment in the fate of imperfect embryos. Indeed this is simply seen as a clinical determination.
Setting aside those instances where PGD is involved, typically, after the rating process is complete and one or possibly two embryos are chosen for transfer, the patient might, as noted above, be given the option of cryopreserving the remaining embryos for later use, which may or may not eventuate. 29 It is not until the patient's clinical engagement with IVF is at an end or when a legally determined storage time limit has expired that gamete providers are prompted to make a disposition decision in relation to any remaining cryopreserved embryos. At this VOLUME17 NUMBER1 MAR2011 90 point, the language shifts from the scientific and instrumental language of the clinic to a strangely imprecise language of affect. Disposition decisions, including compassionate transfer, describe allowing the embryos to 'thaw', 'succumb', and finally 'die'. But what does it mean here to speak of embryo death? This is a moment not so much where death is brought to life but rather where life is undone.
-DEFINING EMBRYO DEATH
How, if at all, can an embryo be said to die? Defining an embryo depends very much on where you stand in relation to it. Scientists who view the embryo as a source of cells for research will have one view, the embryologist working with embryos in the IVF clinic another, people variously called parents, gamete providers, couples, and donors who are directly related to the embryo will have yet more, and so on through to interest groups, lobbyists and the community at large. 30 For the gamete providers perspective consider Jan Archibald, the woman who potted her embryos with an azalea and who, even as an observant Baptist, was clearly struck by the non-corporeality of her potential progeny and its incapacity to participate in the meaningful metaphors of life that attach to organic structure. In her view, the absence of a heart forecloses any metaphysical speculation about the status of the embryo: 'For us, there wasn't an issue with destroying embryos because there wasn't a heart … They were only four cells. A heart, I think, is your soul; that's how we viewed it.' 31 While the lines between life and death appear reasonably clear here, they are less so from a clinical perspective. There, a 'dead' embryo might be described as one in which development is 'arrested'. In other words, cell division has ceased. But it may be that an embryo with 'arrested development' is still metabolically 'active' even though it is no longer dividing. Stephen Minger, a stem cell researcher at Kings College, London, writing in the context of the ethical use of embryos for stem cell research, described them as follows: 'They are arrested, but still metabolically active … So technically they are still alive, and to spin it bio-politically as an ethical source of hESC's [human embryonic stem cells] is completely misleading.' 32 The embryo, then, whatever it is, occupies a hinterland between activity and inactivity rather than the clearer boundaries of life and death. Even in circumstances where it appears to have arrested it may be returned to viability through some further technological intervention. In this way, it continues to be technologically (re)created. David Wasserman describes the process by which they may be reactivated as akin to defibrillation:
In the case of 'dead' embryos, there may be ways to jump-start embryos that have arrested cell division, much like a defibrillator can be used to jump start an individual with cardiac arrest. If so, an arrest in cell division does not necessarily mean the embryo is dead. 33 The artificiality of embryo death is as important as its artefactual life. In this way, we argue, it is the moment of dispositional decision making that actually enacts and constitutes the death scene rather than a biological or a physiological event.
We would like now to turn to the end scene itself and those who create it: the dispositional decision makers.
-DISPOSITIONAL DECISION MAKERS
Dispositional decision makers are those people who at some point will be required to make a decision about what is to done with their unused cryopreserved embryos.
Patients may not contemplate this question until contacted by the clinic to pay a storage bill or because a legally mandated storage time limit has past and the clinic requires a disposition decision. Sheryl De Lacey's studies have shown that more often than not patients avoid disposition decisions for as long as they can. She describes how in the United States regulatory bodies have 'taken the step of defining an abandoned embryo and allowing such embryos to be legally discarded, provided that diligent attempts have been made to contact their owners and there are no advance directives'. 34 In Australia, there are legal limits placed on embryo storage that determine the time frame in which a dispositional decision will have to be made about cryopreserved embryos. 35 A person who removes from storage an embryo that is not to be used for a treatment procedure must ensure that-(a) it is not removed from its container, other than for the sole purpose of observing the embryo; and VOLUME17 NUMBER1 MAR2011 92 (b) it is disposed of in accordance with the regulations. 36 The penalty for non-compliance is severe with a maximum of two years imprisonment. The regulations further require that 'an embryo must be disposed of by allowing the embryo to stand in its container, at room temperature, in a secure area for a period of not less than 24 hours'. 37 The only other state that explicitly referred to disposition decisions was South Australia which had required that 'persons on whose behalf a human embryo is stored outside the human body must have the right to decide how the embryo is to be dealt with or disposed of…' 38 Amendments to the Act that came into effect in In the practice of so-called compassionate transfer, the transfer is not just of the embryo but also of the ethic of compassionate care itself. It is transferred from the realm of mandated respectful attitudes, to the realm of the woman's body that already knows of care and loss and becoming. This transfer also signals another shift away from the master temporality of the clinic that brings bodies under its aegis, that regulates fertility cycles through hormonal interventions, that disciplines them against wasteful practise. Instead, it permits the return to the temporality of the body, its own cycles and flows, its multiple productions and depletions that occur irrespective of the clinic's demands. In so doing, perhaps the clinic reaps an additional benefit by distinguishing this particular death as if it were a discrete occurrence and not indicative of the IVF process as a whole-a process that rests on a logic of surplus (and all that implies) as a defence against the statistically small success rate for pregnancies carried to term.
In Sheryl De Lacey's study she describes how embryo implantation and survival was perceived by participants in what she describes as the 'discard' group to be 'a matter of chance'. 43 De Lacey goes on to note: 'It was evident that many in the "Discard" group had experienced a pregnancy loss in the form of a miscarriage or blighted ovum. Several participants also referred to various uncertainties intrinsic to IVF treatment and their perception of embryo loss as normal.' 44 De Lacey quotes 'Anne-Marie':
For me it was much like the miscarriages [we had]. It's like a sense of lost opportunity in that there was a kid that we'd never met. That's the way I looked at it and I just sort of thought well yes, if I treat it like that, that's the way I'll handle it. Saying goodbye to this embryo was much the same except it was within our control.
'Bee', a blogger who writes on her experience of IVF treatment, also drew on this idea of the naturalness of loss but tellingly described her own sense of embodied performance of holding and connecting to her embryos through this process:
So we have chosen the third option, commonly called 'compassionate transfer' in which the embryos are thawed and placed in my body at a time and using a method that cannot produce a pregnancy. And the mother in me, as I think about the children who are not but might have been, simply wants to hold them for that brief time. And say goodbye. 45 If this is the means to produce an ethical and respectful end how, if at all, is this goal achieved? On the one hand it suggests the role of the maternal body, even as it fails to mother-a guarantee of contact between the surrendered (doomed) embryo and the respectful care of maternal flesh.
But these kinds of transition rituals dedicated to entities that have not yet lived should not be equated with ceremonies one would offer a lost child but rather, we suggest, might represent attempts to recognise and register value in women's experience of the creation of these embryos; the physical and emotional effort that has gone into wanting and making them. In this way, both life and death for embryos are by no means objectively, scientifically, legally identifiable moments. Instead, they might be described as investments-made typically by women but also by other parental figures-in that which is desired. Seen this way it is the desire of these figures that should be considered as enabling the performance of this end scene-perhaps even just to mourn the loss of that desire.
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He is currently working on a cultural history of Victorian domestic discomfort. 26 Similarly, Roberts, who undertook an ethnographic study of IVF clinics in Ecuador, states 'neither practitioners nor patients considered poor-quality embryos to be worthy of mention, or cyropreservation'. These fragmented or asymmetrical embryos were described as 'feo', or ugly. 30 Notably, the embryo itself is far from an agreed upon entity. As far as the legal definition is concerned, it differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Australia the federal government has refined its definition of an embryo over the last five years so that it comes into being only after the first cell 
